Recently Xie et al. [Q. Xie, N. Dong, X. Tan. D. Wong, G. Wang. Improvement of a three-party password-based key exchange protocol with formal verification. Information Technology and Control, 2013, Vol. 42, No. 3, 231-237] proposed an efficient three-party password-based key exchange protocol and used a formal verification tool to verify its security. In this paper, we demonstrate that their protocol is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and the key compromise impersonation attack. The analysis shows that their protocol is not secure for practical applications. To overcome weaknesses in Xie et al.'s protocol, we also propose an improved 3PAKE protocol. Analysis shows that our protocol not only overcomes those weaknesses, but also has better performance. Therefore, our protocol is more suitable for practical applications.
Introduction
The concept of the two-party password-based authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) protocol was first proposed by Bellovin and Merritt [1] . In such protocols, two parties could authenticate each other and generate a session key for future communications through a password shared between them. To ensure secure communication in the peer-to-peer system, a different password should be shared in each pair of communication parties. Then every party of the system has to maintain − 1 passwords if there are parties in the system. Therefore, 2PAKE is not suitable for the large-scale peer-to-peer system. To solve the problems, many three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] were proposed during the last few years.
Lu and Cao [2] proposed an efficient 3PAKE protocol to improve performance in previous protocols. However, many researchers [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] demonstrated that Lu and Cao's protocol is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. To overcome those weaknesses, Huang [9] proposed a new 3PAKE protocol. However, Yoon and Yoo [10] pointed out that Huang's protocol is vulnerable to the undetectable on-line password guessing attack and the off-line password guessing attack. In 2011, Lou and Huang [11] used elliptic curve cryptography to construct a new 3PAKE protocol for resource-constrained devices. Although their protocol has better performance, Xie et al. [12] found that their protocol is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and the partition attack. Xie et al. also proposed an improved 3PAKE protocol to overcome weaknesses in Lou and Huang's protocol. Unfortunately, in this paper, we will demonstrate that Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack and the key compromise impersonation attack. To overcome weaknesses in Xie et al.'s protocol, we also propose an improved 3PAKE protocol.
The organization of the paper is described as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol. Security analysis of their protocol is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 proposes our improved 3PAKE protocol. Security analysis and performance analysis of our protocol are proposed in Section 5 and Section 6 separately. At last, some conclusions are proposed in Section 7.
Review of Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol
In this section, we will give a brief review of Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol. For convenience, some notations are defined as follows.
• The trusted server ( ) chooses a large prime number , an elliptic curve ( ) defined over a finite field , a cyclic group of points over ( ) , a generator of and a secure hash function (⋅) , where (⋅): {0,1} * → . also generates a random number as his secret key and computes his public key = . Let / be the password shared between the user / and . As shown in Fig. 1 , the detail of Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol is described as follows.
1) chooses a random number , computes = , = and = ⊕ ( , , ) . Then sends the message { , , } to .
2) Upon receiving { , , }, chooses a random number , computes = , = and = ⊕ ( , , ). Then sends the message { , , , , , } to .
3) Upon receiving { , , , , , } , computes 
Security analysis of Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol
Xie et al. claimed that their 3PAKE protocol could withstand various attacks. In this section, we will show their protocol is vulnerable to two kinds of attack in different subsections.
Off-line password guessing attack
For password-based protocols, the password guessing attack is very dangerous, since many users would like to choose simple and easy-to-remember password for their convenience. According to Ding and Horster's work, there are three kinds of password guessing attacks [13] , i.e. the detectable on-line password guessing attack, the undetectable password guessing attack and off-line password guessing attack. The off-line password guessing attack is more dangerous than the other two attacks since there is no participation of the user or the server. Xie et al. claimed that their protocol could withstand the off-line password guessing attack. However, in this subsection, we will show that an adversary A could get the user's password through the off-line password guessing attack. Let the equation of the elliptic curve ( ) be 2 = 3 + + , where , ∈ and 4 3 + 27 2 ≠ 0 mod . The detail of the attack is described as follows. [14] .
Therefore, the adversary could find the correct password ′ using the above-described attack with a
the size of the dictionary could be ignored compared with the order of . Therefore, we could conclude that Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack.
Key compromise impersonation attack
As a key exchange protocol, the 3PAKE protocol should provide the known-key security, the perfect forward secrecy, the key compromise impersonation resilience, the unknown key share resilience and the no key control. However, we find that Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol cannot provide the key compromise impersonation resilience, i.e. it is vulnerable to the key compromise impersonation attack. In the 3PAKE protocol, the key compromise impersonation resilience means that any adversary A cannot impersonate another user or the trusted server to the user when he gets 's password. Suppose that A gets 's password , then he could impersonate and to through the following steps. From the above description, we know that confirms the message { , } is sent by . Then A impersonates and to successfully. Therefore, Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to the key compromise impersonation attack.
1) chooses a random number

Our improved 3PAKE protocol
To overcome weaknesses in Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol, we proposed an improved 3PAKE protocol in this section.
The trusted server ( ) chooses a large prime number , an elliptic curve ( ) defined over a finite field , a cyclic group of points over ( ) , a generator of and a secure hash functions ℎ(⋅) , where ℎ(⋅): {0, 1} * → * . also generates a random number d as his secret key and computes his public key = . Let / be the password shared between the user / and . As shown in Fig. 2 , the detail of our improved 3PAKE protocol is described as follows.
1)
chooses a random number , computes = , = and = ℎ( , , , , ) . Then sends the message { , , } to .
2) Upon receiving { , , }, chooses a random number , computes = , = and = ℎ( , , , , ). Then sends the message { , , , , , } to .
3 
Security analysis
In this section, we will analyze the security of our 3PAKE protocol. We will show that our protocol could provide perfect forward secrecy and mutual authentication. We will also show that our protocol could withstand the password guessing, the key compromise impersonation attack, the man-in-themiddle attack, the replay attack, the Denning-Sacco attack, the impersonation attack and the server spoofing attack.
Perfect forward secrecy
Suppose an adversary A could get 's password , 's password and 's secret key . We also assume that A could intercept the message { , , } , { , , , , , } , { , } , { , , } and { } transmitted among , and , where
A could compute and from and . However, he cannot compute = from and since he will face the computational DiffieHellman problem. Therefore, our 3PAKE protocol could provide perfect forward secrecy.
Mutual authentication
. Then could authenticate / by checking the correctness of / . Without / 's password / and 's secret key , any adversary cannot generate a legal = ℎ( , , , , , )/ = ℎ( , , , , , ). Then / could authenticate by checking the correctness of / . Besides, and could authenticate each other by checking correctness of and separately. Therefore, our 3PAKE protocol could provide mutual authentication among , and .
Password guessing attack
It is easy to withstand the detectable on-line password guessing attack and the undetectable password guessing attack by limiting the login time in some period. Then we just need to show that our protocol could withstand the off-line password guessing attack. The information of 's password is included in and , where = ℎ( , , , , ) and = ℎ( , , , , ′ , ) . A could guess a password ′ from a dictionary. However, he cannot verify its correctness since he cannot compute without 's secret key. Then A cannot get 's password through the off-line password guessing attack. Through a similar method, we could show that A cannot get 's password through the off-line password guessing attack. Therefore, our protocol could withstand the password guessing attack.
Key compromise impersonation attack
Suppose an adversary A could get 's password and intercept the message { , , } sent by , where = , = and = ℎ( , , , , ) . To impersonate and to , A has to generate a legal message { , , } , where = ℎ( , , , , ′ , ) , = , = = and = ℎ( , ) . However, A cannot compute correct since he cannot compute without 's secret key. Therefore, A cannot impersonate and to and our protocol could withstand the key compromise impersonation attack.
Man-in-the-middle attack
From the above description, we know that our 3PAKE protocol could provide mutual authentication among , and . Therefore, our 3PAKE protocol could withstand the main-in-the-middle attack.
Replay attack
Suppose that an adversary could intercept the message { , , } and replay it to , where = , = and = ℎ( , , , , ) . However, he cannot generate a legal message { } since he does not know , where = ℎ( , ) and = . Then could disclose the attack by checking the correctness of . Through a similar method, we could show that and also could detect the replay attack. Therefore, our 3PAKE protocol could withstand the replay attack.
Denning-Sacco attack
Suppose that an adversary A could get the session key = and intercepts the message { , , } , { , , , , , } , { , } , { , , } and { } transmitted among , and , where
. However, he still cannot get and since he does not possess 's secret key . Then he cannot get / 's password / . Therefore, our 3PAKE protocol could withstand the Denning-Sacco attack.
Impersonation attack
To impersonate to and , the adversary A has to generate a legal message { , , } , where = ℎ( , , , , ) , = , and = .
A could generate a random number and compute 
Performance analysis
In this section, we will analyze the computational cost and communicational cost of our 3PAKE protocol. We also compare the performance of our protocol with Lou and Huang's 3PAKE protocol [11] and Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol [12] . For convenience, some notations are defined as follows.
• : the running time of a scalar multiplication operation; • : the running time of a map-to-point hash function operation; • : the time of executing a general hash function operation;
It is well known that the running time of a scalar multiplication operation is more time-consuming than other operations. Many implementations of those operations have been reported. In Scott et al.'s [15] , a supersingular curve or non-supersingular curve ( ) over a finite field is chosen, where the length of big number and the order of ( ) is 512bits and 160 bits, respectively. They evaluate the running time using a Pentium IV processor with 512MB RAMS. Besides, the machine under Windows XP offers a maximum clock speed of 3 GHz. The implement results are listed in Table 1 [15] . Table 2 , we list comparisons among, our 3PAKE protocol, Lou and Huang's 3PAKE protocol [11] and Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol [12] in terms of computational cost, where the execution times are measured using Table 1 . Our 3PAKE protocol has better performance than Lou and Huang's 3PAKE protocol at the trusted server side. Lou and Huang's 3PAKE protocol has better performance at the user side. Lou and Huang's 3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and the partition attack. Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol cannot withstand the off-line password guessing attack and the key compromise impersonation attack. Analysis shows that our 3PAKE protocol could overcome weaknesses and has better performance than Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol. Therefore, we can conclude that our protocol is more suitable for practical applications. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we give some analysis about the security of the Xie et al.'s 3PAKE protocol. We point out that their protocol is vulnerable to dangerous attacks. To overcome those weaknesses, we also propose an improved 3PAKE protocol. Analysis shows that our improved protocol not only overcomes those weaknesses, but also has better performance. Therefore, our protocol is more suitable for practical applications.
